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NORA V. DEMLEITNER*
The State, Parents, Schools, “Culture Wars,” and
Modern Technologies: Challenges under the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child†
TOPIC IV. A
This paper focuses on some of the core principles of the U.N. Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child and their application under U.S.
state and federal law. While the United States has not ratified the
Convention, it is a signatory. Many of the most intractable cultural
issues in the United States involve children and their rights to partici-
pation, information, and decision-making. Frequently, primary and
secondary education presents a fertile battle ground for “cultural
clashes” between parents, schools, and state officials. In the private
context, both U.S. law and the U.N. Convention have adopted the “best
interests of the child” standard. Despite the usage of identically
named or similarly sounding concepts, to what extent U.S. approaches
may be aligned or conflict with the Convention remains subject to
question. The United States would benefit from more active participa-
tion in a global dialogue about children’s issues, especially as brain
science and technological change challenge our traditional under-
standing of what it means to be a “child” and a “parent.”
The United States has signed but not ratified the U.N. Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which makes it one of only
three countries that do not fully participate in this almost universally
ratified human rights treaty.1 With its signature the U.S. govern-
* Dean and Roy L. Steinheimer, Jr. Professor of Law, Washington and Lee Uni-




11&chapter=4&lang=en (listing signatories and ratifiers of CRC as of Oct.14, 2013).
The other two countries are Somalia, which only in 2012 re-established a national
government after decades of civil war, and South Sudan, which became a member of
the United Nations in July 2011. The United States has ratified two of the three addi-
tional protocols to the CR. See http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11-c&chapter=4&lang=en (listing signatories and ratifiers of the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Chil-
dren, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography as of Oct. 14, 2013) and http://
treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-11-b&chapter=4&
491
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ment has indicated not only its general support for the principles of
the CRC and the protection of the human rights of children, but also
signaled U.S. compliance with these norms.2 In recent decades, the
U.S. Senate has generally been reluctant to ratify international trea-
ties in the human rights area for domestic reasons, including
preservation of states’ rights, sovereignty concerns, questions of con-
stitutionality, rejection of international accountability, and fears of
foreign interference in the U.S. legal system.3 Parental rights organi-
zations have objected to ratification of the CRC, fearing it would
empower children.4
This paper focuses on some of the core principles of the CRC and
their application under U.S. law. As the laws of individual states
rather than federal law govern many of these central issues, this can
lead to distinct approaches, especially as new technologies impact
family relations, including conception. Many of the most intractable
cultural issues in the United States involve children or arise in the
context of primary and secondary education, often pitting children
against parents or against the state.
The curious role of children in the United States may be dis-
played nowhere better than in the criminal justice context. For the
sake of children, U.S. sentencing has become ever harsher over the
last thirty-five years. Enhancements have been applied to drug sell-
ers who are offering illegal narcotics near schools;5 child sexual
offenders and those watching child pornography on the Internet have
witnessed a dramatic lengthening of their sentences and at the same
time have been exposed to life-long registration and community noti-
fication statutes. They have been barred from living near schools and
daycare centers and even from frequenting playgrounds.6
On the other hand, children have also experienced the harshness
of the criminal justice process. In the late 1980’s, the fear of crime
became amplified because of the image of the “superpredator,” the
lang=en (listing signatories and ratifiers of the Optional Protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict as of Oct.
14, 2013).
2. UNICEF, Introduction to the Convention on the Rights of Child: Definition of
key terms, available at http://www.unicef.org/crc/files/Definitions.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition to Human
Rights Treaties in the United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10
HUM. RTS. Q. 309 (1988).
4. See, e.g., parentalrights.org. For a full discussion of the arguments for and
against ratification, see Congressional Research Service, Luisa Blanchfield, The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Apr. 1, 2013.
5. For criticism of these sentence enhancements, see, e.g., Aleks Kajstura, Peter
Wagner & William Goldberg, The Geography of Punishment: How Huge Sentencing
Enhancement Zones Harm Communities, Fail to Protect Children (July 2008), availa-
ble at www.prisonpolicy.org/zones/.
6. For a critique of these developments, see Kelly K. Bonnar-Kidd, Sexual Of-
fender Laws and Prevention of Sexual Violence or Recidivism, 100(3) AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 412 (2010).
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adolescent, ruthless, violent offender.7 In response, states allowed for
or even mandated the transfer of juveniles into the adult criminal
justice system.8 Some states sentenced offenders as young as thirteen
to life-without-parole. This trend has been reversed only in recent
years through Supreme Court cases that barred the death penalty
and mandatory life-without-parole for those who committed homicide
while under age 18.9 It also prohibited life-without-parole for juvenile
non-homicide offenders, in recognition of the mental and emotional
differences between adults and children.10 The criminal justice sys-
tem is indicative of the tension in which U.S. society and the U.S.
legal system often find themselves with respect to the treatment and
protection of children.
As the political culture in the United States values limited gov-
ernment and protections of the individual against the state, even the
juvenile justice system extends extensive procedural protections to
children. They have, however, been employed to justify harsher pen-
alties. In general, U.S. law emphasizes rights rather than duties, an
approach in which it varies, for example, dramatically from the Afri-
can Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.11 Despite that
political and legal belief structure, the common law has established
duties based on special relationships, including those between hus-
band and wife and a parental duty to reasonably protect a child.
Explicit duties of children to parents appear limited to special situa-
tions. A child may owe a parent a duty of care, for example, when the
child voluntary takes custody of an ailing parent in a way that pre-
vents others from providing care to that parent.12
This paper will begin with definitions of “child” and “parent” and
then turn to the core concept of “best interests of the child” and its
application in select contexts. Next, it looks at three areas in which
the rights of parents, children, and the state have come to clash—the
right to speech, to information, and to freedom of religion—especially
in the public school setting. All of these issues reflect ongoing
changes in technology, society, and law, situating children at the
center of crucial societal conflicts in the United States.
7. Shay Bilchik, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Chal-
lenging the Myths, JUVENILE JUST. BULL. (Feb. 2000), available at www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/ojjdp/178993.pdf.
8. For an example, see Human Rights Watch, No Minor Matter: Children in Ma-
ryland’s Jails (1999), available at www.hrw.org/reports/1999/maryland/.
9. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juvenile death penalty unconstitu-
tional); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life-
without-parole sentence unconstitutional when applied to a juvenile convicted of a
homicide offense).
10. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
11. Art. 31.
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
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I. WHO IS A “CHILD”?
The authority to determine who is a child and what rights that
person carries is divided between the federal and state governments.
At common law, the age of majority was generally 21 years. Today
the age of majority is regulated legislatively. While most people deem
18 the age of majority, the law appears more fluid.13 With the excep-
tion of the right to vote—which the U.S. Constitution grants at 18
years due to a constitutional change in 197114—most of the rights of
children are age-dependent and may extend beyond 18 or end before
that age. State legislatures regulate the specific numerical age at
which individual rights arise.15 Such regulation may accord with the
CRC’s approach that increasing rights (and responsibilities) be given
to children as their age and maturity increase (up to the age of 18
unless otherwise determined under a country’s law),16 though U.S.
law extends this concept of maturation beyond 18 in select areas. It
appears that the CRC prefers individual assessment of a child’s ma-
turity, though in some contexts, it may accept at least a presumption
of maturity or allow for a global age-based determination on effi-
ciency grounds.
The specific age at which a child is legally considered an adult
varies depending on the context. For example, the Alaska legislature
set the default age of majority at 18 years. For select purposes, how-
ever, Alaska lowered that age. These include ownership of long guns
(allowed at age 16, without parental consent) and consent to sexual
contact (16 years, but elevated to 18 years if the child’s sexual part-
ner “has legal authority over the child”).
On the other hand, Alaska has raised the age of majority above
and beyond the general statutory age of majority for select purposes,
such as possession of tobacco (19 years) and possession of alcoholic
beverages (21 years). While many of these increases and decreases
are specific to individual states and may be explained either by cul-
tural differences between states or by specific incidents that have
driven legislative change, others are based on federal mandates.
In all states, purchase and public possession of alcoholic bever-
ages are allowed only at age 21, though many states permit
exceptions to these general rules.17 When the federal government
13. See Stanley v. Stanley, 112 Ariz. 282 (1975) (“majority or minority is a status
rather than a fixed or vested right and [ ] the legislature has full power to fix and
change the age of majority.”).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
15. See 43 C.J.S. Infants § 2 (Westlaw 2013).
16. CRC art. 1.
17. National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, Alcohol Policy Informa-
tion System, Underage Drinking: Possession/Consumption/Internal Possession of
Alcohol, available at http://alcoholpolicy.niaaa.nih.gov/underage_possession_consump
tion_internal_possession_of_alcohol.html?tab=maps (listing exceptions to rule).
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tied federal highway funds to the purchase or public possession of
alcohol by those under 21, over time every state changed its law so as
to guarantee its receipt of federal monies.18 Even though Congress
would have been barred from legislating a national drinking age, it
achieved the same goal through its power of the purse.
In addition to the constitutionally based provision on voting age,
other federal (and state) constitutional provisions may regulate cer-
tain aspects of the age of majority. The federal constitution’s equal
protection mandate, for example, bars state legislatures from declar-
ing different ages of majority applicable to females and males, even in
situations where biological and emotional maturity may differ.19
The Supreme Court has indicated increasing interest in child de-
velopment concepts, especially in the sentencing area. It declared the
execution of those who committed a capital offense while under the
age of 18 unconstitutional, relying on child development literature,
which finds children fundamentally different from adults as their
judgment and emotional maturity are not yet fully developed.20 The
Court has recently applied this line of jurisprudence also to life-with-
out-parole sentences.21 Whether this approach will carry over into
other areas of the law remains an open question. At this point, it
presents a welcome reprieve for some young offenders, at least at the
high end of sentencing.
As the CRC defines “child,” a definition generally accepted in the
United States, even though with respect to some rights and obliga-
tions the specific age cut-off may vary, it fails to provide a definition
of “parent.” In light of modern technological changes, that definition
and the implicit rights and duties have become increasingly compli-
cated. Recently, the U.S. Department of State ruled that U.S.
citizenship will transmit to a child born to a U.S. citizen mother but
conceived with the egg of a non-U.S. citizen. The definition of “par-
ent” will likely cause further questions in the years ahead and
present challenges in different areas of the law. For purposes of this
paper, the term will be used in its commonly understood meaning.
18. National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984, 23 U.S.C. § 158.
19. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (a state law allowing fe-
males who are 18 years old to purchase nonintoxicating beer, while barring purchase
of such beer by males under the age of 21, constituted unconstitutional discrimination
in violation of the equal protection clause); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975)
(in the context of child custody, no valid distinction regarding the age of majority can
be made on the basis of gender).
20. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
21. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life-with-
out-parole sentence unconstitutional when applied to a juvenile convicted of a
homicide offense); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life-without-parole uncon-
stitutional for those who committed non-homicide offense before turning 18).
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II. PARENTAL RIGHTS
Generally, the state grants parents broad leeway in educational
and parenting choices for their children, including ways to punish
children. Only in exceptional circumstances will parents be deprived
of their rights because of abuse or neglect. Schools, however, are fre-
quently held to a different and higher standard than parents.
Societal norms, for example, have evolved with respect to corporal
punishment in schools, and continue to undergo changes, though
they have not yet impacted parental freedom in that area.
A. Corporal Punishment
The Supreme Court decided in 1977 that corporal punishment in
schools does not violate the 8th Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishments.22 Currently, half of the states regulate corpo-
ral punishment statutorily, with some banning it, while others allow
it expressly.23 Within the family, physical punishment of children re-
mains permitted,24 apparently under a general belief that “some”
corporal punishment benefits (or at least does not harm) a child.
There is no debate in the United States about the international com-
munity’s moving increasingly to a total prohibition on the physical
punishment of children, including in families, under CRC Article
19.25
B. Loss of Parental Rights
Even in the United States physical punishment is limited by con-
siderations of the child’s best interest. Should parents violate such
restrictions they may lose their parental rights. Physical harm is not
the sole ground for such a decision. Under federal law, child abuse
and neglect is defined as including sexual, emotional, and physical
abuse, exploitation, and abandonment.26 Many state statutes provide
for the deprivation of parental responsibility upon a finding that a
22. See Ingraham v. Wrights, 430 U.S. 651, 671 (1977).
23. See Corporal Punishment in Public Schools, 0040 SURVEYS 7 (2007)
(Westlaw).
24. See 6 AM. JUR. 2d Assault and Battery § 28 n.1 (“A parent, or one acting in loco
parentis, does not commit an assault and battery by inflicting corporal punishment on
a person subject to the person’s authority, if the parent remains within the legal lim-
its of the exercise of that authority.”).
25. See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Gershoff, More Harm Than Good: A Summary of Scien-
tific Research on the Intended and Unintended Effects of Corporal Punishment on
Children, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 54-56 (2010) (discussing social science re-
search detailing negative effects of corporal punishment and adoption of bans on such
punishment in dozens of countries around the globe).
26. Federal Child Victims’ and Child Witnesses’ Rights Act of 2009, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3509 (West, Westlaw through 2013) (“[T]he term ‘child abuse’ means the physical or
mental injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, or negligent treatment of a child.”). See
also 42 AM. JUR. 2d Infants § 18 (West, Westlaw through 2013).
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parent is guilty of a federal or state crime against children.27 The
state may also terminate a parent’s right to have a relationship with
her child pursuant to a finding of abuse, or other event that shows
that the parent is “unfit”—but the finding of unfitness must be made
by at least clear and convincing evidence.28 In addition, incarceration
longer than 15 months may cause termination of a parent’s legal re-
sponsibility for their child. Because of the negative impact of such a
forced separation on parent and child, in recent years some criminal
justice policies, such as drug courts, have been developed in part to
keep the family unit together.29
Courts and state administrative agencies, such as child protec-
tive services, may deprive a parent of parental responsibility.30 A
state’s choice in these tools is a matter of preference, and the federal
constitution only requires that the parent’s procedural due process
rights be honored, which means notice and an opportunity to be
heard. States vary in their provision of trial by jury for proceedings
involving termination of parental rights.31 Any of these procedural
protections only apply to the permanent termination of parental
rights but not to temporary removal of children from the home.
In most states, both the parent and the child have the right to an
attorney, paid by the state if they cannot afford one, because of the
gravity of the rights at stake in termination proceedings. In about a
dozen states, however, children continue to remain unrepresented.32
When a child has been abused or neglected, she becomes a ward
of the state, which means dependent on the court. It is the task of the
court to preserve the child’s relationship with her parents if at all
possible. This mandate aligns with CRC Article 9, which asks that
states keep parents and children together unless such a separation is
necessary because the parents, for example, have dissolved their rela-
27. See 59 AM. JUR. 2d Parent and Child § 34 (West, Westlaw through 2013). For
examples of how states define child abuse and neglect, see generally U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children & Families, Child Wel-
fare Information Gateway, What Is Child Abuse and Neglect? (2008) available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/whatiscan.cfm.
28. See 53 A.L.R.3d 605 (West, Westlaw through 2013); 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent
and Child § 34 (West, Westlaw through 2013).
29. See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Special Issue: Making a Better World for Children
of Incarcerated Parents, 50 FAMILY CT. REV. 23, 27 (2012); A Jailhouse Lawyer’s Man-
ual, Chapter 33: Rights of Incarcerated Parents, COLUMBIA HUM. RTS. REV. 896 (9th
ed. 2011).
30. See Child Abuse, 0080 SURVEYS 18 (2007) (“The agency to whom suspected
abuse is reported is often a state child protection office that is not hindered by the
same constitutional restrictions to which traditional law enforcement agencies are
subject. These agencies are sometimes allowed to take custody of children prior to
actually proving that abuse has occurred.”).
31. See 102 A.L.R.5th 227 (2002).
32. Erin Shea McCann & Casey Trupin, Kenny A. Does Not Live Here: Efforts in
Washington State to Improve Legal Representation of Children in Foster Care, 36
NOVA L. REV. 363 (2012).
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tionship and live separately or because of abuse or neglect of the
child. Under U.S. law, if preserving this relationship would lead to
the continuance of abuse, neglect, or instability in the child’s life, a
court may provide a new permanent and stable home for the child.
As the court explores the feasibility of preserving the child-par-
ent relationship, the two parties will initially be separated only
temporarily. The state can house children for a short period of time,
upon the government’s further evaluation of the fitness of the parents
or the home for the children, with the assumption that the child will
be returned home. If the parent is abusive, s/he can be removed from
the home, and through a protective order be ordered to cease contact
with the child. Children may also be put in the care of another family
member, a situation that can be temporary but also evolve into long-
term placement. Should no suitable family member be available, chil-
dren can be placed in foster care. Within a year in foster care it
should be determined whether children will eventually be put up for
adoption. This process has been accelerated to avoid the long-term
placement of children in foster care. As domestic adoptions can be
fraught with difficulties and many individuals prefer to adopt young
children, many children remain in foster care until they age out of
the system at eighteen. This happens currently to 11% of all children
in foster care.33
Even though the state can completely and irrevocably terminate
the rights of a parent to a relationship with their child, it must prove
the need for such a deprivation by clear and convincing evidence.
This is a very high standard because natural parents have a “funda-
mental liberty interest . . . in the care, custody, and management of
their child [that] does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to
the State.”34 On the other hand, parents whose parental rights have
been terminated do not appear to owe their former (legal) child any
duties, though this may differ from state to state.
When a child’s interest is at stake, including the termination of
parental rights, the CRC, under Article 3, requires that state and pri-
vate welfare agencies, the legislature, administrative agencies, and
the judiciary make the “best interests of the child” standard their pri-
mary consideration. The next section will define the standard under
U.S. law and apply it in a number of different settings. It will con-
clude with a critique of the application of the standard to individual
situations in which the child is involved directly but a refusal to ap-
ply it when a child’s welfare is at stake indirectly or when application
of the standard would require societal changes.
33. Children’s Rights, Facts About Aging Out, available at http://www.childrens
rights.org/issues-resources/foster-care/facts-about-aging-out/.
34. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
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III. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD STANDARD
Many of the distinctions between those below and those above
the age of majority seem to be driven by considerations of the best
interests of the child, a standard that originated in the United
States.35 As a matter of both common and statutory law, best inter-
ests of the child have been the guiding principle in many U.S.
jurisdictions for more than 125 years.36
A. Best Interests Defined
States may adopt the best interests standard either through leg-
islation or through judicial decision-making. Today all fifty states
have laws that require use of this standard in many areas of law,
including child labor, education, adoption, custody, and placement of
children.37 Federal law also uses the concept when addressing child
welfare issues under its jurisdiction. Legislative proposals to change
the focus of the standard, in some cases to increase parental rights,
have generally failed.38
All states of the union, the District of Columbia, and several U.S.
territories have statutes that direct courts to consider the best inter-
est of the child when making important life decisions.39 With respect
to custody decision, many state statutes specify a number of non-ex-
clusive factors to consider. Common among these factors are (a) the
health, safety, and welfare of the child, including the petitioning par-
ents’ capacity to provide medical care, clothing, sustenance, and
emotional support; (b) the existence of domestic violence in the home,
and whether the party seeking custody is the perpetrator; (c) the
35. Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child
Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J. L. & FAMILY STUDIES 337 (2008).
36. See Howard Davidson, A Model Child Protection Legal Reform Instrument:
The Convention on the Rights of the Child and Its Consistency with United States
Law, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 185, 191 (1998). Not all child-related legislation
necessarily serves a child’s best interest. The United States, for example, still permits
recruitment of 17-year-olds (with parental consent) into its military. See Join the
Military: Eligibility Rules, at www.military.com/join-armed-forces/eligibility-require
ments. Human rights law on this issue continues to evolve.
See JONATHAN TODRES, MARK E. WOJCIK & CRIS R. REVAS, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY IMPLICATIONS AND OF U.S. RATIFI-
CATION 123 (2006) [hereinafter TODRES, WOJCIK & REVAS].
37. For a discussion of the movement toward a different standard in custody
cases, see Richard A. Warshak, Parenting By The Clock: The Best-Interest-of-the-
Child Standard, Judicial Discretion, and the American Law Institute’s “Approxima-
tion Rule,” 41 BALTIMORE L. REV. 83 (2011).
38. High-profile adoption cases have questioned the rights of parents in contrast
to the “best interests” of the child. See Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental
Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 63 (1995).
39. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Chil-
dren & Families, Child Welfare Information Gateway, Determining the Best Interests
of the Child 1 (2012), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_poli
cies/statutes/best_interest.pdf.
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child’s relationship to the parties seeking custody; (d) the mental and
physical health of the parents seeking or defending custody; (e) the
present or probable future stability of the child’s social environment.
The last factor compares the child’s greater support system in the
current environment, including relationships with friends and fam-
ily, with the probable state of a future support system after a given
custody ruling. The test, therefore, allows for great flexibility and
adaptability, which also makes it subject to criticism especially on
grounds of unequal application.
Since the best interest standard is prevalent in U.S. law, com-
mentators on the CRC have generally argued that its implementation
in the United States “would require little or no adjustment in [its]
long-standing history of attempting to keep the ‘best interests of the
child’ at the forefront of judicial and legislative activity.”40 This may,
however, not be true for all individual requirements under the CRC,
especially as many pose novel issues. This includes the right of chil-
dren to preserve their identity under CRC Article 8, which includes
“nationality, name and family relations . . . .”
B. The Right to Identity
In light of modern reproductive technology, DNA testing, and
changing family relations, the definition of “family relations” has
come under pressure. Under common law, the mother’s husband was
assumed to be the child’s biological father. Today, a child may file a
paternity suit to rebut the paternity of that person and any other
person claiming to be a father, or bestowed with the title of a parent
by a court. In such situations, the court is free to compel a putative
parent, or a person whose parental status is challenged, to submit to
DNA testing.41
Children born out of wedlock are permitted to sue to establish
paternity. Whether they are able to establish their relationship with
a putative parent through blood and/or genetic tests depends on the
nature of the procedure,42 as blood tests may generally be used only
to exclude paternity, but not to confirm paternity status over the ob-
jection of a parent.43
Legal parenthood and questions of identity may, in some situa-
tions, also pose challenges for same-sex couples. The Department of
State appears to have recognized just recently the child of a lesbian
couple as “born in wedlock” if the child is conceived from the egg of
one woman and carried by the other. For a woman, therefore,
“mother” becomes defined as being the genetic or the gestational and
40. TODRES, WOJCIK & REVAS, supra note 36, at 126.
41. See 41 AM. JUR. 2D Illegitimate Children § 31 (Westlaw 2013).
42. See 14 C.J.S. Children Out-of-Wedlock § 97, § 76 (Westlaw 2013).
43. See 41 AM. JUR. 2D Illegitimate Children § 31 (Westlaw 2013).
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legal mother of the child, at least under one set of legal rules. How
this will impact other legal concepts of parenthood and issues of iden-
tity remain open questions.
The right to know one’s identity looks different for adopted chil-
dren. In most U.S. jurisdictions, adopted children do not have a right
to find out who their biological parents are as most adoptions are
“closed.”44 Some jurisdictions allow an adopted child to learn identify-
ing data about his/her biological parents upon a showing of good
cause, and federal courts of appeal have upheld such legislation as
constitutional. In many states, an adopted child does not have the
right to discover even non-identifying data about their biological par-
ents, including medical information or religion. Only a few states now
require the inclusion of non-identifying information (medical and so-
cial histories) that can be released on request of the adopted child.45
There is no indication of a substantial trend away from closed or
near-closed adoptions.
The courts of two states, Tennessee and Oregon, notably diverge
from the majority approach.46 In those states, a child may obtain ac-
cess to identifying data relating to their biological parents if
disclosure is in the best interest of the child. Courts in both states
have subordinated the parents’ constitutional claims to a privacy in-
terest in personally identifying data to the state’s interests in the
disclosure of parental identity inherent in administering adoptions.47
Modern technological advances increase the relevance and the
stakes of decisions surrounding the discoverability of one’s biological
parents. Perhaps not surprisingly, in cases of artificial insemination
by donor (AID) disclosure of the donor’s medical data as well as non-
identifying data is held to a standard similar to the disclosure of the
identity of the natural parent of an adopted child.48 In most states,
children conceived through AID are unable to gain access to informa-
tion relating to their natural biological donor, though at least
eighteen states have passed laws that allow such children to gain ac-
44. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Chil-
dren & Families, Child Welfare Information Gateway, Access to Adoption Records
(June 2012), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/stat
utes/infoaccessap.pdf.
45. See 1 LEG. RTS. CHILD. REV. 2D § 6:12 (2d ed.) (Westlaw 2012).
46. Janet Leach Richards, Medical Confidentiality and Disclosure of Paternity, 48
S.D. L. REV. 409, 427–28 (2002–03).
47. See Does 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7 v. State, 164 Or. App. 543, 565 (1999) (“Because a
birth mother has no fundamental right to have her child adopted, she also can have
no correlative fundamental right to have her child adopted under circumstances that
guarantee that her identity will not be revealed to the child.”); Doe v. Sundquist, 2
S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tenn. 1999) (denying birth mothers’ claims that Tennessee statute
allowing children put up for adoption to obtain identifying data about their birth par-
ents after attaining the age of 21 violated mothers’ constitutional rights).
48. See Lucy R. Dollens, Artificial Insemination: Right of Privacy and the Diffi-
culty in Maintaining Donor Anonymity, 35 IND. L. REV. 213, 217 (2001).
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cess upon a showing of cause. The California Court of Appeals, for
example, held that the constitutional interest in maintaining ano-
nymity was limited and outweighed by the state’s interest in
preserving children’s right to discover their identity.49 Only a small
number of state courts have held that biological donors have a lower
constitutional privacy interest in non-identifying than in identifying
data, causing the states’ interest in disclosure to override the lowered
privacy interest.
While modern family relations with their frequent distinctions
between biological, social, and legal parent(s) may constitute the
most challenging frontier of the law, wide variety exists between
countries with respect to rules on children’s names and name
changes.50
C. Changing One’s Name
When a child requests change of his first, or determination or
change of his last name, courts apply the best interests standard.51
When changes of the last name are considered, courts turn to the fac-
tors employed in custody cases: effect of the change on the
preservation and development of the child’s relationship with each
parent; the identification of the child as part of the family unit; the
length of time that the child has used the surname; the preference of
the child if the child is of sufficient maturity to express a preference;
whether the child’s surname is different from the surname of the
child’s residential parent; the embarrassment, discomfort, or inconve-
nience that may result when a child bears a surname different from
the residential parent; important ties to family heritage, ethnic iden-
tity, and cultural values; and parental misconduct or failure to
maintain contact with and support of the child.52
At the birth of a child, parents generally choose a child’s first
name without state interference. Should a child petition for change of
name, the court considers the following issues in light of the best in-
terests of the child: the child’s preference; the effect of the change of
the child’s name on the preservation and development of the child’s
relationship with each parent; the length of time the child has borne
a given name; the degree of community respect associated with the
present and proposed names; the difficulties, harassment, or embar-
rassment that the child may experience from bearing the present or
proposed name; and the existence of any parental misconduct or
neglect.53
49. See Johnson v. Superior Ct., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 864 (Ct. App. 2000).
50. See, e.g., Thanks, mum: Governments find reason to regulate the names of chil-
dren, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 2012.
51. See 65 C.J.S. Names § 24 (Westlaw 2013).
52. See id.
53. See id.
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Even though parents are left largely free in their choice of a
given name for their child, a child’s name change will be subject to a
searching test, presumably to ascertain the child’s rationale and seri-
ousness of purpose and to avoid negative repercussions from a name
change. The court’s goal is clearly to protect the child’s interest in
these rare cases.
D. Critique
Historically, the best interest test may have hidden gender bias
and continues to be applied disparately to different socio-economic,
racial, ethnic, and religious groups. In addition, use of the test in
some areas of the law conceals the poor treatment to which other ar-
eas of the law, such as the criminal justice system, subject children.
Only recently has the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that chil-
dren’s intellectual and emotional development differs dramatically
from that of adults, leading to restrictions on the most arduous and
punitive sanctions imposed, including the death penalty and life-
without-parole.
When children are the object of the decision-making, as in the
cases outlined above or in custody situations, the best interest stan-
dard will be applied, even though perhaps not always equally. It has
not been expanded, however, to the situations in which the state’s
decision will have a dramatic impact on the child even though the law
does not exert its force upon the child directly. Two such situations
involve the criminal sentencing of a parent (in criminal prosecutions
unrelated to the child) and the decision to deport the non-citizen par-
ent. In both of these cases the existence of a child or the importance of
the relationship between the parent and the child are rarely consid-
ered, barring extraordinary situations, despite an increasing array of
literature indicating the negative consequences of parental, and espe-
cially maternal, incarceration or deportation.
Over the last two decades, the number of prisoners who have at
least one minor child has increased substantially, so that in 2010
2.3% of all minor children living in the United States had at least one
incarcerated parent. Almost half of all prisoners have a minor child.
Black children were 7.5 times and Hispanic children 2.5 times more
likely to have a parent in prison than white children.54 A recent
study has found a substantial impact of parental imprisonment on a
child’s educational attainment, later unemployment, and involve-
ment with the criminal justice system, especially following maternal
incarceration. Perhaps most surprisingly, the same study found that
the impact of maternal incarceration extends beyond the child to the
entire community by depressing college graduation rates of young
54. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Lauren E. Glaze & Laura M. Maruschak, Parents
in Prison and Their Minor Children (Aug. 8, 2008; rev. Mar. 30, 2010), NCJ 222984.
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people educated in schools where between 10 and 20% of other chil-
dren had an incarcerated parent.55 The U.S. criminal justice system,
as the legal system as a whole, is individually oriented and therefore
only rarely allows for consideration of third-party interests at sen-
tencing. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, for example, indicate that
“family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in deter-
mining whether a departure [from the otherwise applicable
guidelines sentence, which is primarily based on the offense of convic-
tion and the offender’s criminal history] may be warranted.”56
A similar situation involves the deportation of non-citizen par-
ents. As the United States subscribes to the ius soli (and ius
sanguinis) principle of citizenship, even the children of undocu-
mented migrants born in the United States automatically obtain
citizenship. With the parents remaining without a legal status, how-
ever, if a removal order issues, they (and their children) face the
choice between returning to the parents’ country of citizenship or sep-
arating the family, often with serious long-term emotional and
financial consequences. Parental arrest and detention, in addition to
ultimate removal and long-term bans on return, inflict serious psy-
chological harm on children.57 Only in recent months has the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement issued a policy outlining en-
forcement priorities and prosecutorial discretion, with the goal of “not
unnecessarily disrupt[ing] the parental rights of both alien parents or
legal guardians of minor children.”58 How successfully that policy has
been implemented and whether it has served children well, may be
too early to assess.
Failure to consider children’s interests and wellbeing when a
state decision will impact them dramatically has negative effects so-
cietally and systemically. Even though the best interest standard
permeates many areas of judicial and agency decision-making, it re-
55. John Hagan & Holly Foster, Children of the American Prison Generation: Stu-
dent and School Spillover Effect of Incarcerating Mothers, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 37
(2012).
56. U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, §5H1.6. Family Ties and
Responsibilities (Policy Statement) (2013).
57. See, e.g., Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Report to the Urban Institute, Severing a
Lifeline: The Neglect of Citizen Children in America’s Immigration Enforcement Policy
(2009).
58. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 11064.1: Facilitating Parental
Interest in the Course of Civil Immigration Enforcement Activities (Aug. 23, 2013). For
a critique of the memorandum as failing to allow for individual consideration, see
Mills Legal Clinic at Stanford Law School & Center for Justice and International
Law, Supplemental Report on Prosecutorial Discretion and Family Unity Addressing
U.S. Government Policies Issued After Submission of Petitioners’ Report in support of
the Public Thematic Hearing on Human Rights of Migrants and Legislative Reform in
the United States before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (149th Pe-
riod of Sessions) pursuant to Article 66 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, available at www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/
project/443312/doc/slspublic/13-10-22%20FINAL%20Supplemental%20Report.pdf.
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mains inapplicable when the child’s fate is not directly at issue
despite it being indirectly affected.
Application of the best interest standard or direct imposition of
state measures on children imply their right to provide input, though
not necessarily the right to make a decision.
IV. ABORTION, CUSTODY, ADOPTION: CHILDREN’S RIGHTS TO
EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS
CRC Articles 12 and 13 guarantee that a child has meaningful
opportunities to express her views freely in all matters affecting her,
though this does not necessarily imply decision-making authority.
The First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech extends to
children though children seem to possess lesser rights to expression
than adults under the same circumstances, especially if the state can
show a compelling state interest in restricting a child’s right to ex-
press an opinion.59
In criminal proceedings, juveniles accused of crimes are guaran-
teed due process during both the pretrial and trial stages under the
5th, 6th, and 14th amendments, which includes the right to be
heard.60 As victims of criminal offenses, children also have a right to
participate in the criminal justice process, though the process may
have to be accommodated, especially for younger children.
The weight of the child’s opinion in family matters and health
issues, the most frequent situations in which such right will be exer-
cised, increases with the age and maturity of the child.61 Three
areas—abortion, custody, and adoption—may be of particular impor-
tance to children, and especially older children.
A. Abortion
With respect to one highly charged issue—abortion, it has been
hotly debated where the power to make a final decision resides and
how to weigh a child’s opinion. States may not impose a blanket pro-
vision requiring the consent of a parent or person standing in the
position of a parent to the abortion of an unmarried minor. The Su-
preme Court invalidated a state statute that required minors to
secure written parental consent before having an abortion.62 Instead
59. Congressional Research Service, Henry Cohen, Freedom of Speech and Press:
Restrictions to the First Amendment (2009); 1 CHILDREN & THE LAW: RIGHTS AND OBLI-
GATIONS § 1:7 (Westlaw 2012).
60. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966); see also In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 12-18 (1967).
61. See Virginia Mixon Swindell, Children’s Participation in Custodial and Pa-
rental Right Determinations, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 659, 674-76 (1994).
62. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72 (1976);
Swindell, supra note 61, at 672-73.
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the Court suggested alternative procedures if the state wishes to still
restrict minors’ abortions.
Pregnant minors are entitled to show that they are sufficiently
mature and well informed to make the abortion decision themselves
upon consultation of a doctor but without any parental consent.
Should the minor be insufficiently mature to make such a decision,
the court can determine independently that an abortion is (not) in the
best interests of the child. The so-called judicial bypass has been es-
tablished to protect minors and shield them from having to share
their plans with their parents.
The decisions on a minor’s right to consent to an abortion have
influenced judicial guidance on other medical procedures. The Su-
preme Court suggested, for example, that a state’s requiring a
minor’s written consent for other procedures besides abortion may be
equally constitutional, as long as the surgery is sufficiently serious.63
How the courts will react, for example, to the desire of a minor to
have a sex change surgery that lacks parental support remains an
open question.
The state or a third party may have less power to override a
child’s refusal to undergo surgery than it has regarding a child’s wish
to have surgery.64 The weight given to a child’s refusal is a function of
the court’s determination of the child’s maturity and competence to
make reasoned decisions. These two factors also play a determinative
role in a court’s assessment of a minor’s views in custody situations.
B. Custody
The most common situation in which children are heard is cus-
tody cases. Many states allow a child to express a preference in
custody hearings, and in most states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico, the child’s preferences are considered in custody rulings.
In the great majority of American states, children do not need to at-
tain a specific numerical age before being allowed to participate in
custody proceedings affecting them, or before the child’s stated pref-
63. See Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 67 (“As a consequence, we see no consti-
tutional defect in requiring it only for some types of surgery as, for example, an
intracardiac procedure, or where the surgical risk is elevated above a specified mor-
tality level, or, for that matter, for abortions.”).
64. Ross Povenmire, Do Parents Have the Legal Authority to Consent to the Surgi-
cal Amputation of Normal, Healthy Tissue from Their Infant Children?: The Practice
of Circumcision in the United States, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 87, 102
(1999). The United States, under federal law, prohibits female genital mutilation,
sometime referred to also as female circumcision, unless health considerations coun-
sel in favor of it. 18 U.S.C. §116 (2012). Male circumcision is permitted and remains
widespread in the United States, though the national rate of newborn circumcision
has been dropping over the last few years. The latter, of course, precludes participa-
tion of the child in the decisionmaking.
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erences be given weight in the court’s best interest analysis.65
Instead, most courts look to the “maturity” of a child—specifically
whether the child has, to the court, sufficiently developed the emo-
tional and intellectual capacity necessary to make an informed
decision regarding her preferences. The weight courts assign to the
preferences of a child scales with the level of maturity the judge ob-
serves.66 Some states, however, take a hybrid approach, specifying
age minimums for some purposes in child custody hearings but di-
recting the judge to determine maturity holistically for other
purposes in the same hearing.
In California, for example, children age 14 and older are permit-
ted to address the court regarding custody and visitation, unless,
pursuant to a finding on the record, the judge determines that “doing
so is not in the child’s best interests.”67 Children under the age of 14
may participate in custody hearings affecting them, but do not, like
children over 14 years, benefit from a presumption in favor of their
participation.
Notably, state courts give varying degrees of weight to the pref-
erences of a mature child in best interest custody determinations.
The first states that gave controlling and mandatory weight to child
preference in custody determinations were four southern states:
Georgia, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas.68 There is some specula-
tion that the American South’s traditional allocation of more
responsibility to children motivated this approach. In more recent
years, however, most states have moved away from a mandatory
scheme to a best interest approach that preserves judicial discretion.
Some of the states require children be “informed” before they are
allowed to state a preference or before the judge can determine the
weight of this preference. In child custody proceedings, a guardian ad
litem or special attorney has the power to move discovery and get
information from either of the two parents to enable the child to
make an informed decision about which of the parents s/he prefers to
have primary custody.69
65. See CHILD CUSTODY PRAC. & PROC. § 4:11 (Westlaw through Mar. 2012).
66. See Barbara A. Atwood, The Child’s Voice in Custody Litigation: An Empirical
Survey and Suggestions for Reform, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 634 (2003) (noting that 80%
of Arizona judges surveyed considered the preferences of older teenagers to be “very
significant” in their decisionmaking, while only 40% of judges interviewed would give
similar weight to the preferences of children aged 11-13 years, and 70% of judges
interviewed agreed that the preferences of very young children are given “no signifi-
cance at all” in their best interest custody determinations).
67. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042(c), (d) (West, Westlaw through 2013).
68. See Kathleen Nemechek, Child Preference in Custody Decisions: Where We
Have Been, Where We Are Now, Where We Should Go, 83 IOWA L. REV. 437, 445 (1998).
69. CHILD CUSTODY PRAC. & PROC. § 12:13 at n. 5 (Westlaw 2012) (providing a
diverse list of jurisdictions that require the appointment of an attorney who is
granted the same powers of discovery as the other parties). See Andrea Khoury, The
True Voice of the Child: The Model Act Governing the Representation of Children in
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Child custody decisions may come at any point in a child’s life,
and the same holds true for adoptions, though the participation and
decision-making role of children in the adoption process is more
substantial.
C. Adoption
Adoptions generally require greater child involvement in the de-
cision-making than custodial arrangements.
In many states, if the child being adopted is over a certain
age, he or she must consent to the adoption. The age of chil-
dren who must give their consent to adoption generally
ranges from 10 to 14. Absence of such consent is apparently
an absolute bar to adoption. The preferences of younger chil-
dren may also be considered by the court, but are not
binding.70
While many adoptions occur within the United States, the
United States is also involved in inter-country adoptions, as a net
“importer” of children.71 Congress ratified the 1993 Hague Conven-
tion on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption and made national legislation applicable to all
adoptions “involving United States residents”—apparently as par-
ents or children.72 This legislation (and the Convention) requires that
all groups that offer cross-border adoption services in connection with
a United States person must satisfy certain accreditation require-
ments and be approved by United States accreditation entities.
Accreditation standards mandate that the agency provide the pu-
tative parents a copy of the medical records of the child in English. To
protect the child, the agency must conduct a thorough background
report, including a home study, of the prospective parents. The adop-
tion service must bill on a fee-for-service basis, not a contingency fee
basis. In addition, the adoption service must disclose fully its policies
and practices, the disruption rates of its placements for intercountry
Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings, 36 NOVA L. REV. 313, 317 (Spring 2012)
(“There is also the same lack of uniformity within the states, regardless of statutory
guidance. In one county there may be a ‘lawyers for children’ program, and lawyers
are regularly appointed, and in another county in the same state, there is no such
similar program, and courts will appoint nonlawyers or Court Appointed Special Ad-
vocates (CASAs).”).
70. 1 LEG. RTS. CHILD. REV. 2D § 6:5 (2d ed.) (Westlaw 2012).
71. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Children’s Is-
sues, FY2012 Annual Report on Intercountry Adoptions (Jan. 2013), available at
adoption.state.gov/content/pdf/fy2012_annual_report.pdf. Despite a high total num-
ber of foreign adoptees, per capita the United States ranks only in the middle of
highly developed Western democracies with respect to the total number of children
adopted from abroad. See Australian InterCountry Adoption Network, International
Adoption Statistics, available at www.aican.org/statistics.php.
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 14901–54 (2000); 2 AM. JUR. 2d Adoption § 46 (Westlaw 2013).
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adoption, and all fees charged for such adoptions. These rules have
been developed to protect potential parents from exploitation and
children from illicit transfer and trafficking. This is particularly im-
portant as children in intercountry adoptions tend to be younger and
are often unable to participate in the adoption process. Despite the
heightened protections for both sides implicit in these requirements,
intercountry adoptions have created diplomatic tensions between the
United States and some sender countries.73
Above section has focused on the relationship between children,
their parents, and the state, largely in its judicial or legislative role.
Many other legal areas involving children’s rights heavily implicate
(public) schools.
V. SCHOOL AND WORK
Depending on state laws, schooling from an age range between 5
and 8 up to 16 to 18 is compulsory in the United States. That require-
ment can be fulfilled through school attendance or home schooling.
Approximately three percent of American children are being home
schooled. Ten percent attend private rather than public schools.
Children may take on paid work outside the home while still in
school, as envisioned in CRC Article 32 para. 2 point a. Federal and
state laws regulate child labor. Regulations include restrictions on
the number of hours children can work, what times of day a child
may work, what general occupations are fit for children, what specific
tasks children can perform, and under what conditions they may per-
form those jobs.
Federal law mandates the minimum age for employment, with-
out parental consent, at 16 years, except for agricultural work.74 The
federal minimum age for non-agricultural employment is 14 years,
which means that even with parental consent, a child under 14 years
may not work.75 Under federal law, the hours a child can work during
the week also depend on the age of the minor—14-year-olds are per-
mitted to work significantly fewer hours than 16-year-olds. Under
U.S. Department of Labor regulations, workers between the ages of
16 and 18 years are prevented from engaging in employment the de-
partment finds to be particularly hazardous or detrimental to their
health or well-being.
Agricultural employment does not require a minimum age. While
child labor laws do not apply to a child working on her parent’s farm,
they apply generally to a child working on a farm owned by someone
73. See Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Written declaration 536: In-
tercountry adoption: Children as hostages of international relations, Doc. 13113 rev.
(Jan. 29, 2013).
74. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(l) (2006).
75. See 29 C.F.R. § 570.2 (West, Westlaw through May 2013).
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other than her parents. With parental consent children as young as
12 may work on such a farm, in some states for up to twelve hours
and without being paid minimum wage. Children’s farm work—and
work in the entertainment industry—remains poorly regulated. For
many American children in rural areas, therefore, agricultural work
may be a regular part of their lives, leaving less time for school-re-
lated work. Rural schools and educational attainment during
primary and secondary school do not seem to be measurably below
those in more urban or suburban settings; college attendance rate,
however, is lower.
Schools themselves have frequently been the flashpoint of chil-
dren’s rights, especially the right to expression and the concomitant
right to information, to allow for the formation of an opinion, which
can then be expressed. Both aspects are encapsulated in CRC article
13 subject to limited exceptions outlined there.
VI. ACCESS TO INFORMATION: TENSIONS BETWEEN PARENTS,
SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN
The Convention explicitly guarantees the right to information
while the First Amendment only implicitly protects the right of ac-
cess to information as such access is a necessary condition for the
meaningful exercise of the right to free expression. Even in the case
of adults, the right to information remains insufficiently developed.76
In a case indirectly involving children, the Supreme Court struck
down a federal law that had prevented the mailing of unsolicited ad-
vertisements relating to the availability of contraceptives, in part
because the law denied parents information necessary to make in-
formed decisions about birth control and discuss it with their
children.77 The law remains unsettled when the child’s desire for in-
formation conflicts with her parents’ wishes, however. In this case,
the courts must (or should) determine the extent and nature of the
child’s autonomous liberty interest —as distinct from her freedom of
speech—as it is closely connected to the right to information.
A child’s autonomy interests inevitably conflict with constitu-
tional principles protecting the parents’ rights to control and raise
their children free from (most) governmental interference.78 Parents
have a recognized liberty interest in raising their children by the
methods they desire, and are given great latitude in making choices
for their children—including, for example, a parent’s decision to re-
76. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established
that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas. ‘This free-
dom (of speech and press) . . . necessarily protects the right to receive . . . .’ ”);
Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive Information, 2 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 223, 227, 230-31 (1999).
77. See Bolger v. Young Drugs Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983).
78. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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move her child from otherwise mandatory lower education for
religious and social reasons—seemingly without consideration of the
child’s wishes.79 Minor children do not have any constitutional rights
in the home that can be enforced against their parents, including the
right to speech or information unless their parents give them such
rights.80
Outside the home, parents and governments may influence chil-
dren’s access to information. Both government regulations and
parental preferences will be less certainly enforced outside the home
against a child who is considered “mature” since the child’s First
Amendment rights and constitutional interest in autonomy increase
with age and maturity. Courts do not employ numerical age to decide
dispositively a child’s (lack of) maturity. A “mature” child’s right to
information is said to be strongest when access to that information is
necessary for meaningful exercise of another fundamental right, such
as that of protecting a would-be mother’s decision to obtain an abor-
tion—even if the would-be mother is legally a minor. Healthcare
providers, therefore, may provide information necessary for informed
consent to a medical procedure, including abortion and contraception,
to minors.81
Most states allow parents to have significant control over the
public school education of their children.82 However, they cannot pre-
vent public schools from teaching topics that they find morally
offensive.83 Many of these disputes have centered on sexual educa-
tion as well as the teaching of evolution in public schools. In those
situations, the state must allow for parents to seek alternatives to
public schooling, and cannot limit what parents teach their chil-
dren.84 On the other hand, school boards—with or without the
consent of parents—have the authority, for example, to ban certain
books from the curriculum and from school libraries, as long as they
do not do so because they merely disagree with the content but rather
because of the educational suitability of the content.85
79. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 224–35 (1972).
80. Both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV only prevent deprivation
of civil liberties by state actors.
81. Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
82. See Ross, supra note 76, at 247 n. 120 (providing a list of state statutes that
allow parents to opt out or provide substitute education that they choose on controver-
sial topics, and statutes that require the school to give notice to the parents of
students if the school curriculum contains education on controversial topics).
83. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533–34 (1995).
84. See Ross, supra note 76, at 247.
85. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982).
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In public school settings, the right to freedom of expression, in-
cluding the reception of information, has frequently collided with the
right to religious freedom.86
VII. RELIGION IN SCHOOL: THE “CULTURE WARS”
Among the core CRC articles is 14, which guarantees children
the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Under the
U.S. Constitution, freedom of religion is guaranteed though the
United States perceives itself has having a religious (largely Judeo-
Christian) citizenry. For that reason the U.S. Supreme Court has de-
veloped extensive jurisprudence on how to assure the separation of
church and state without unduly burdening the exercise of religious
practice.
Education about religion, though not religious instruction, is
available in public schools, as both an obligatory and an optional sub-
ject. Instruction about world religions, for example, is perfectly
acceptable though attempts to teach religion in public schools would
likely lead to Establishment Clause87 challenges because public
schools are state actors. Those challenges can be overcome if the
teaching activity satisfies a three-part test.88 First, the law under
scrutiny must “reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose,” which
has been interpreted to mean that the law’s explicit purpose cannot
be designed to advance or inhibit religion.89 Second, the law must
“have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion”
(emphasis added). Third, the law must be religiously neutral to
“avoid excessive entanglement with religion.”90 Public schools can
therefore mandate that students study subject matters relating to re-
ligion, so long as the school curriculum, including religious studies,
reflects a secular legislative purpose—such as to teach social studies
or literature—and so long as the primary effect of the curriculum is
not to inhibit or advance certain religious ideals.91 Beyond these re-
strictions, states are given substantial leeway—substantively and
procedurally—in creating public school curricula.92
86. Approximately 10% of children in the United States in pre-kindergarten
through 12th grade are enrolled in private schools, with about 80% of all private
schools being religiously affiliated. Council for American Private Education, Facts
and Figures, at www.capenet.org/facts.html.
87. U.S. CONST. Amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion . . . .”).
88. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772
(1973).
89. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
90. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (involving
property tax exemptions to religious institutions).
91. See Hall v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of Conecuh Cnty., 656 F.2d 999, 1001-03 (5th
Cir. 1981).
92. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 300 (1963) (“To
what extent, and at what points in the curriculum, religious materials should be cited
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On numerous occasions, religiously motivated school boards have
attempted to weave religious ideals into mandatory school courses,
for example by requiring the study of “intelligent design” or “creation
science” along with evolution theory, restricting the teaching of
evolution theory, or requiring abstinence-only sexual education.
Courts are accustomed to applying the judicially created Establish-
ment Clause test in such situations. The Supreme Court struck down
a Louisiana law requiring that god-creation viewpoints be presented
whenever evolution science was discussed in the classroom because
the law served no secular purpose.93
The courts also held policies in Dover, Pennsylvania, unconstitu-
tional when a largely religiously conservative school had adopted a
classroom disclaimer that specifically referenced “intelligent design”
(a relabeling of “creation science”) as an alternative theory to evolu-
tion science, and later voted to change the ninth-grade biology
curriculum to “make ninth grade biology students ‘aware of gaps/
problems in Darwin’s theory and of other theories of evolution, in-
cluding, but not limited to, intelligent design.’”94 Such efforts by local
school boards continue in religiously conservative communities
throughout the United States.
Ironically, religious activists have occasionally seized onto the re-
quirement to avoid “religious entanglement” to justify their
introduction of religious views into school curricula. Some have ar-
gued that evolution science promotes atheism or the absence of god,
which is “a religion,” and therefore sole presentation of this science
“theory” itself violates the Establishment Clause.95 Courts, however,
have rarely permitted the presentation of religious views to balance
“anti-religion.”
With the Supreme Court having closed most other doors to the
promotion of religious beliefs regarding the origins of humankind, re-
ligious activists have instead attempted to find a secular purpose for
“Darwin disclaimers,” which are notices provided to students that
evolution science is “only a theory” to be considered among other ex-
planations for the origins of humankind, including creation science,
intelligent design, or other explanations involving a divine source.
Religious activists in state legislatures have also sponsored laws that
instruct local school districts to “promot[e] critical thinking skills” by
listing scientific theories that are deemed by statute to be “rightly
are matters which the courts ought to entrust very largely to the experienced officials
who superintend our Nation’s public schools.”).
93. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 581 (1987). See generally Edward J.
Larson, Teaching Creation, Evolution, and the New Atheism in 21st Century America:
Window on an Evolving Establishment Clause, 82 MISS. L.J. 997, 1020 (2013).
94. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp.2d 707 (M.D. Penn. 2005).
95. See Blog: Religion & American Law, Evolution and Atheism: Is There a Con-
nection? (Oct, 6, 2013), available at http://religionandamericanlaw.blogspot.com/2013/
10/evolution-and-atheism-is-there.html.
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subject to critical analysis,” including “evolution, the origin of life,
global warming, and human cloning.”96 These disputes, as curious as
they may appear to non-Americans, are an integral part of the Ameri-
can legal system where the tension between religious freedom and
the avoidance of state-sponsored religions inherent in the First
Amendment often plays out in the school setting.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The CRC covers broad territory. Whether U.S. law always con-
forms to its requirements remains questionable, especially in light of
the diversity of approaches within the United States. The most diffi-
cult questions under both the CRC and the U.S. Constitution and its
laws pertain undeniably to the clash of rights between parents, the
state, and children, many of which occur in the public school setting.
The United States would benefit from participating in a global
dialogue on these challenging issues. This is particularly true as
modern technology may expand the concept and undermine the tradi-
tional notion of parent. U.S. scholars and practitioners may also gain
perspective and insight from the different understanding or applica-
tion of legal concepts, such as the best interest standard.
96. See Larson, supra note 93, at 1008-32.
